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I COMMENTS[

Paved with Good Intentions: The Legal
Consequences of the Charitable Choice
Provision
I.

Introduction

In their Contract with America, the Republicans in Congress
promised to seek ways to reduce the welfare system that has
supported millions of Americans for sixty years.' The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA") achieves this goal.2 Signed into law by President
Clinton on August 22, 1996, PRWORA is an attempt to give more
power to the states.3 It will significantly reduce federal government involvement in welfare by providing block grants to states to
provide welfare.4 States may then contract out or otherwise
privatize welfare services through nonprofit, private organizations.'

1. See Governor Peter Wilson, Wilson Speech to Heritage Foundation on "Kicking
America's Welfare Habit," (Sept. 6, 1995), available in WESTLAW, Federal Materials,
Congressional Information, U.S. Political Transcripts; Phillip Michaels, National Issue: Why
Is Gingrich So "Radioactive"? As Press Courage Has Gone, So Have His Ratings,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 30, 1996, at Al.
2. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 604(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
3. See Ashcroft Urges States, Charities,and Churches to Embrace Landmark Reforms
in New Welfare Law (Oct. 23, 1996) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/10-23-96.htm>
[hereinafter Ashcroft Urges States].
4. See id.
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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Within PRWORA is a section known as the Charitable Choice
Provision6 (the "Provision") proposed by Senator John Ashcroft, a

freshman Republican from Missouri, and passed in the Senate by
a sixty-seven to thirty-two vote.7 The Provision prohibits a state
from discriminating against religious organizations if it decides to
fund any private organization,8 but the Provision allows states to9
contract with religious organizations to provide welfare services.
Senator Ashcroft wrote the Provision because he recognized that
private institutions can address the individual needs of a family
better than the government."t Ashcroft believed that religious

organizations are in a unique position within the community to

6. 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(c). The Provision states in relevant part:
NONDISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. In the
event a State exercises its authority under subsection (a) [of this section,] religious
organizations are eligible, on the same basis as any other private organization, as
contractors to provide assistance, or to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms
of disbursement, under any program described in subsection (a)(2) so long as the
programs are implemented consistent with the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution. Except as provided in subsection (k), neither the Federal
Government nor a State receiving funds under such programs shall discriminate
against an organization which is or applies to be a contractor to provide assistance,
or which accepts certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement, on the
basis that the organization has a religious character.
Id.
7. See Senate Adopts Ashcroft Education Amendments; Welfare Reform Passes 74-24
(July 23, 1996) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/7-23-96.htm>.
8. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(c).
9. See id. § 604a(a). The Provision states:
(a) IN GENERAL.
(1) State options. A State may(A) administer and provide services under the programs described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B)(i) of paragraph (2) through contracts with charitable,
religious, or private organizations; and
(B) provide beneficiaries of assistance under the programs described
in subparagraphs (A) and (B)(ii) of paragraph (2) with certificates, vouchers, or
other forms of disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations.
(2) Programs described. The programs described in this paragraph are the
following programs:
(A) A State program funded under part A of title IV of the Social
Security Act (as amended by section 103(a) of this Act).
(B) Any other program established or modified under title I or II of
this Act, that(i) permits contracts with organizations; or
(ii) permits certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement to be provided to beneficiaries, as a means of providing assistance.
Id.
10. See Bid Farewell to a Failed Welfare System (June 1995) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/opfarwel.htm> [hereinafter Bid Farewell].
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provide hope and assistance to members of that community." He
wrote the Provision so that religious organizations that accepted
2
funding would not have to change their internal structure.'
Very little legislative history exists regarding the Provision.
The history available states that the law before PRWORA,13
embodied in the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act
("CCDBG"), did not allow the use of funding for a sectarian
purpose regardless of whether the funds were given in grants or in
contracts. 4 In addition, CCDBG prohibited religious discrimination; however, religious organizations could require employees to
adhere to certain religious tenets. 5 The history also explains that
the Provision allows states to contract with secular or religious
organizations for welfare services.' 6
Through the Charitable Choice Provision, Congress has
attempted to get the best of both worlds-providing for low-income
families through religious programs that work; however, Congress,
in its legislative history, made no mention of the constitutional
problems that arise under the Provision. 7 Not only does the
Provision expose many religious organizations to unpredictable
amounts of litigation, but it threatens their existence as currently
structured. So, can the Provision work?
The Provision raises important church/state issues, and its
influence is far-reaching. Most people would agree that religion is

11. See Ashcroft Emphasizes Need for Welfare Reform Responds to Clinton's Decision
to Sign Bill (Aug. 1, 1996) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/8-01-96.htm>.
12. See Bid Farewell, supra note 10. Senator Ashcroft regrets that "many of these
organizations have stood on the sidelines because all too often government funds require a
radical change in the program-changes that would rob many programs of the very character
that makes them successful." Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9858 (1994).
14. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-725, § 92 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649,
2705. The text states:
The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act prohibits use
of any financial assistance provided through any grant or contract for any sectarian
purpose or activity. In general, the CCDBG requires religious nondiscrimination,
but does allow a sectarian organization to require employees to adhere to its
religious tenets and teachings.
Id.
15. See id.
16. See id. This provision states that "religious organizations would be eligible, on the
same basis as any other private organization, to provide assistance as contractors or to accept
certificates and vouchers so long as their programs are implemented consistent with the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution." Id.
17. See generally id.
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a hotly debated topic in the United States. Furthermore, religious
liberties issues have been a sensitive topic in this country for
centuries, hence the inclusion of both the Free Exercise18 and the
Establishment 9 Clauses in the Constitution. ° The Supreme
Court has decided innumerable cases on the separation of church
and state.2 ' Most recently, these decisions have centered around

governmental funding to parochial schools, an issue that is still
unresolved despite the volume of case law on the subject. 2

Commentators have extensively debated whether the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses
is wrought with fallacies, contradictions, and inadequa3
2

cies.

The American people have also shown a great interest in
religious issues. 24 In fact, most Americans value their right of the
free exercise of religion above their right to free speech. 5
Additionally, Americans have traditionally shown concern about
the prospect of their tax money funding religious programs. 26 The
Provision has an impact on taxpayers in general because federal tax
money will be used to fund assistance programs run by nonprofit

18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. Id.
20. See MICHAEL MCCONNELL, Taking Religious Freedom Seriously, in RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE CASES THAT DEFINE THE DEBATE OVER CHURCH
AND STATE (Terry Eastland ed., 1993); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE 150 (2d ed. 1987).

21. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366
(1918); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
22. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For a survey on the state of the law, see Jesse H.
Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L.
REV. 329 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 519 (1994); Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence:The Souring of Lemon and the Searchfor a New Test, 27 PAC. L.J. 121 (1995).
24. See MARY ANN GLENDON, Religion and the Court: A New Beginning?, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE CASES THAT DEFINE THE DEBATE

OVER CHURCH AND STATE (Terry Eastland ed. 1993); see also supra note 20.
25. See GLENDON, supra note 24, at 471.
26. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing
to sue under the Establishment Clause based on the taxing and spending power of Congress).
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organizations eligible under PRWORA.2 7 Faith Communities2 8
are also affected as they may be forced to choose between
accepting governmental funds and continuing to proclaim their
religious mission.29
The Charitable Choice Provision is a well-intentioned attempt
by Congress to privatize welfare; however, the inevitable litigation
of the Free Exercise and the Establishment issues makes the
Provision impractical.3" Congress may more effectively achieve its
purpose through alternative methods. 3' Part II of this comment
addresses the purpose of PRWORA and, more specifically, the
Charitable Choice Provision, including the governmental trend
toward privatization of welfare and increase in personal responsibility. Part III exposes some of the weaknesses inherent in the
Provision and the constitutional challenges that will likely arise as
a result of the Provision.32 Part IV proposes possible solutions to
the problems raised in Part III. This section also includes alternatives to the Provision, such as modifying the tax code to give more
benefits for charitable contributions, that might accomplish the
same legislative goals.
II. The Purpose of PRWORA and the Charitable Choice Provision
The purpose of the block grants to states, as set forth in
PRWORA, is to give states more flexibility in designing a welfare
system that assists families, ends dependency and promotes "job
preparation, work, and marriage,"3 3 reduces out-of-wedlock

27. The organization will receive money through PRWORA, which is funded by tax
dollars.
28. "Faith communities" is the term currently used to refer to religious institutions. See
HENRY G. CISNEROS, HIGHER GROUND: FAITH COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

(U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., Feb. 1996). This comment uses this term
interchangeably with "religious organizations," "religious institutions," and the like. The
term "church" is used only when specifically referring to Christianity, "synagogue" for
Judaism, and "mosque" for Islam.
29. See discussion infra Part III.F.
30. See discussion infra Part Il1.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.
32. For a different conclusion regarding the constitutionality of government funds to
religious organizations for welfare services, see Carl Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for
Governmental Cooperationwith Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers,46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997)
(arguing that the neutrality theory is coming to replace separationism in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and that the "pervasively sectarian" standard is unconstitutional).
33. 42 U.S.C.S. § 601(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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States may

achieve the purpose by privatizing welfare, especially in view of the
rising cost of welfare.35 States may contract with religious organizations to provide welfare services.36 In fact, Congress included

the Provision so that states would not discriminate against religious
organizations in allocating the federal welfare grants.37
A.

The Goal of Privatization

A goal of PRWORA is to privatize welfare to a greater
degree.38 Privatization has various meanings depending on the
context of the word.39 Privatization could be achieved by the
government selling its land and businesses to private companies or

by an outright elimination of government presence in a particular
field.'

The privatization involved in PRWORA, however, is a

down-sizing of government in a particular enterprise; here, that
enterprise is welfare.4 1

In general, reasons for privatization

include government inefficiency, restriction of government from a
particular activity, and lack of technological advancement.42 These
reasons apply to the privatization of welfare. Private organizations
have proven much more efficient and effective in caring for needy

34. See id.
35. See id. § 604a(a).
36. See id.; Dave McNeely, Texas Looks to Religious Groups to Help Provide Social
Services, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 2, 1997, at J3.
37. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(c). Congress included the Provision into PRWORA so that
states could not discriminate against religious organizations in allocating funds to private
programs to help the poor.
Another issue raised by the Provision is whether states, absent the Provision, may
discriminate against faith communities when allocating funds in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this
comment. For a brief argument on the topic, see James C. Geoly, Charity Replaces
Bureaucracy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1996, at A12. See also Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (applying the rational basis test to
state action that violates religious conduct).
38. See generally 42 U.S.C.S. § 601.
39. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449
(1988). Cass' article provides an excellent summary of the different types of privatization,
the arguments for and against privatization, and the constitutional impediments to
privatization. See id.
40. See id. at 450; Lawrence W. Reed, The Good News about Privatization,VISION &
VALUES (ALUMNI Assoc. PUB., GROVE CITY COLLEGE, PA.), Nov. 1996, at 1.
41. See Cass, supra note 39, at 451.
42. See id.; Reed, supra note 40.
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people than governmental programs.4 3 Privatization of welfare
can save taxpayers substantial amounts of money.' Examples of
the savings possible through privatization generally include: $1.4
million saved on garbage collection in Michigan;45 forty to fifty
percent in Philadelphia for governmental programs privately
contracted;' and $1.8 million in garbage collection costs in
Phoenix.4 7

Additionally, many citizens have become disillusioned by the

welfare system and the myriad of problems that accompany it.'
The inefficiencies of the welfare system have resulted in a drain on

the budget, additional taxes, and more than a generation of people
who have become dependent upon the government for their
livelihood.49

Privatization will have several advantages over public control

of welfare.5"

First, since private organizations are more cost-

effective, taxpayers will get more "bang for their buck."'" Thus,
more needy people will be helped for fewer tax dollars.52 Addi-

tionally, private organizations are more able to work personally
with beneficiaries. 53 Therefore, organizations can address the
needs of the entire person instead of just their physical needs.5 4

Thus, recipients of assistance from private organizations will be
encouraged to become less dependent on "the system" for their

sustenance.

The system's emphasis on undertakings beyond

43. See discussion infra Part II.C. See also A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE: THE
RULES OF SECTION 104 OF THE 1996 FEDERAL WELFARE LAW GOVERNING STATE
COOPERATION WITH FAITH-BASED SOCIAL-SERVICE PROVIDERS, (The Ctr. for Pub. Just.
and The Christian Legal Soc'y's Ctr. for L. and Religious Freedom, Jan. 1997) [hereinafter
A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE].
44. See Reed, supra note 40.
45. See id. at 5.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 4.
48. See Dick Armey, Uncommon Leader ...and Common Scolds, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1997, at A12.
49. For an interesting description of one man's experience with the welfare system, see
Bruce Barron, Making Welfare Work, Person by Person, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Sept.
10, 1995, at Fl. Barron had the opportunity to participate in a simulation of the welfare
system as a 30 year-old mother of two. See id. His experience taught him the frustrations
of the system and the need for reform. See id.
50. See Reed, supra note 40; see generally Cass, supra note 39.
51. Cass, supra note 39, at 451.
52. See generally id.
53. See CISNEROS, supra note 28, at 5.
54. See id.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:2

handouts encourages personal responsibility and a solid work ethic.
Finally, Senator Daniel Coats, a Republican from Indiana and an
active participant in the design of PRWORA, advocated a change
in the way low-income families are given aid.5" He emphasized
the desirability of aid 56from private organizations because of their
"innovative services."
B. CongressionalFindings Producing Welfare Reform
In PRWORA, Congress set forth the findings it made that led
Congress to write the Act.5 7 Congress made various findings
supporting marriage and the integrity of the two-parent home.58
The increase in single-parent homes has also increased the current
number of welfare recipients. 59 Furthermore, Congress found that
the number of dependents of the welfare system is more than three
times the number of welfare recipients in 1965.60 Congress further
expounded on the increase in out-of-wedlock children born, the
increase in teenage pregnancy, and the decrease in pregnancy
among married couples.61 The increase in out-of-wedlock pregnancies and births directly correlates with an increase in the
number of welfare recipients. 62 Additionally, Congress reported
the disadvantages for both the children and society when children
are born out of wedlock.63 Congress also connected the rise in
out-of-wedlock pregnancy and decline in two-parent homes with

55. Coats Leads Effort to Place Charity Tax Credit in Welfare Reform Bill, GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES, Nov. 9, 1995, available at 1995 WL 11631074 [hereinafter Coats
Leads Effort].
56. See id.
57. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2110, cited in 42 U.S.C.S. § 601 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1997) (History; Ancillary Laws and Directives).
58. See § 101, 110 Stat. at 2110-12. For instance, Congress found that 89% of children
receiving welfare are raised solely by their mothers. See id. § 101(5).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. § 101. The rate of teen pregnancies rose 23% from 1976-1991. See id.
§ 101(6)(A). Out-of-wedlock pregnancies as a whole rose 14% from 1980 to 1992. See id.
Pregnancies within marriage, on the other hand, decreased 7.3% from 1980 to 1991. See id.
PRWORA predicts that out-of-wedlock births will account for 50% of all births by 2015.
See id. § 101(6)(B).
62. See id. § 101(8)(F).
63. See § 101(8)(F), 110 Stat. at 2111. For instance, children born out-of-wedlock
average low or moderately low birth weights. See id. The children are "more likely to have
lower cognitive scores, lower educational aspirations, and a greater likelihood of becoming
teenage parents themselves." Id.
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the rise in crime rates among youth.64 Congress concluded that it
has a valid governmental interest in preventing out-of-wedlock
pregnancy and that PRWORA is designed to address the problem
of the inefficiency of the welfare
system to respond to the increase
65
in the number of recipients.
C. Success of Religious Welfare Programs
In designing PRWORA, Congress recognized that government
should rely on private organizations to help solve the problems
plaguing welfare. 6 Therefore, Congress offered funding to all
private, charitable organizations, regardless of sectarianism, so that
the organizations and the government could work together toward
a solution.67 Senator Ashcroft regarded the Provision as "a major
step toward reforming welfare."' The senator noted the commitment that religious organizations make to the long-term improvement of recipients' lives as well as the institutions' ability to
transform lives. 69
He asserted that government lacked the
compassion necessary to restore hope to beneficiaries.7"
He
stressed that under the Provision faith communities would not "be
stripped of their spiritual or religious elements as a prerequisite to
receiving funds."71
Religious organizations, by far, have been more successful than
the government at meeting the needs of and reforming the lives of
welfare recipients.72 Not only do these groups have a greater
impact, but they achieve success in a more cost-efficient way than
governmental programs.73
Henry Cisneros, Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, wrote an essay
that described the unique potential that religious organizations have

64. See id. § 101(9). Only 29.8% of all youths incarcerated are from two-parent homes.
See id.
65. See id. § 101(10).
66. See Real Progresson Welfare Reform (Oct. 1995) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/opwelfar.htm>.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See Senator John Ashcroft, Letter, (visited Feb. 8, 1997) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/genwelfa.htm> [hereinafter Ashcroft, Letter]; Ashcroft Urges States, supra note 3.
70. See Senator John Ashcroft, Down 0-2, Clinton Finally Connects on Welfare Reform
(Aug. 22, 1996) <http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/8-22-96.htm>.
71. Ashcroft, Letter, supra note 69.
72. See Randy Frame, ReligiousNonprofits Fightfor Government Funds, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, Dec. 11, 1995, at 65.
73. See id.
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to provide services to the poor in a way that the government
cannot.74 The success rate of faith communities means more people
who are off the streets, off drugs, and productive members of
society with productive lives.
III. Constitutional Challenges to the Provision
Although the Charitable Choice Provision may solve some
problems in the welfare system, it buys legislative ease with judicial
headaches. The Provision tries to walk the tight line between the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. One problem with the Provision is the dichotomy
between these two clauses. 7 5 Another problem is that the Provision expects religious organizations to provide the same services
that they do now with a similar success rate by completely
eliminating their motivation-religious worship, instruction, and
proselytization.
A.

The Free Exercise/EstablishmentClause Dichotomy

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall pass no laws
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."76 Although the language seems clear, the
clauses have resulted in volumes of cases and articles about the
tension between them.77 On one hand, Congress may not restrict
the free exercise of a religion;" yet, on the other hand, Congress
may not establish that religion,79 which could result if Congress
does not restrict free exercise.8' For example, Congress may not
tell a church that it cannot say a prayer before distributing food
purchased with public funds to the poor. However, if Congress

74. See CISNEROS, supra note 28.
75. See generally JOHN C. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 17.1 (4th ed. 1991).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); William Bentley Ball, Supreme Court Review: Church/State Jurisprudence,
36 CATH. LAW. 101 (1996) (giving a general overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence);
Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473 (1996).
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See id.
80. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 75 (comparing the position of the Supreme
Court in similar circumstances).
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does not so restrict the church, then Congress will advance the
church's religion through establishment. Thus, in passing a law that
affects a religious group, Congress must carefully draft legislation
so that the religion is not "established." Unfortunately, the care
Congress takes often results81 in some kind of a restriction of the
group's free exercise rights.
In deciding a case, the judiciary must walk the same line, often
erring on the side of no establishment. 2 For example, Congress
could pass a law that revoked unemployment compensation if a
person refused to work without "just cause., 8 3 A Seventh Day
Adventist could not obtain employment because, in accordance
with her religious beliefs, she refused to work on Sunday.' 4 By
interpreting "just cause" to exclude religious reasons, a court could
avoid establishing any religion that set aside a holy day during the
week.85 The court's decision, however, would sacrifice the
individual's ability to freely exercise her religion. 6 If the judiciary
struck down the law on Free Exercise Clause grounds, the court
would protect the individual's right but may be considered to
"establish" a religion.' Thus, courts have the seemingly impossible task of reconciling the Establishment and the Free Exercise
Clauses.
B. The Provision

The language of the Provision exemplifies the dichotomy
between the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. On one
hand, the Provision expressly states that the programs funded under
the Provision must be "implemented consistent with the Establishment Clause." s Furthermore, the Provision prohibits any funded
organization from discriminating against an individual in providing
81. For example, some organizations may have to "dilute their message." Geoly, supra
note 37, at A12.
82. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 75. Additionally, one should
compare the strictness of the Court's Establishment Clause test, see discussion infra Part
III.C., with the rational basis test used in Free Exercise cases, see Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
83. The facts of this hypothetical are modified from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (holding that a person could not be denied unemployment benefits because she
refused to work on Sunday in accordance with her religious practices).
84. See generally id. at 399.
85. See generally id. at 398.
86. See generally supra note 82 and accompanying text.
87. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 75.
88. 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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services "on the basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal to
actively participatein a religious practice."89 Finally, the Provision
clearly states that the funds may not be used "for sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization."9 ° The Provision's Establishment
Clause language does not pose any constitutional problems as it is
consistent with the line of Establishment Clause cases that expound
upon the constitutionality of funding to religious organizations,
specifically, the school aid cases. 91
The problem arises when the language that supports the
Establishment Clause is read in conjunction with the Free Exercise
language of the text. For instance, the Provision allows states to
fund religious organizations "without impairing the religious
character of such organizations." 92 However, the very nature of
many organizations is to worship, instruct, and proselytize. 93 If
the organization acts according to its character, then it will
"diminish[] the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance
funded under such program." 94 Thus, a church whose purpose is
to "spread the gospel" cannot receive funds under the Provision
without either violating the Establishment Clause (and the language
of the Provision) or being restricted in its ability to freely exercise
Christianity. 95
In addition, the Provision states that a religious organization
receiving funds "shall retain its independence from Federal, State,
and local governments, including such organization's control over
the definition, development, practice, and expression of its religious
beliefs." 96 Furthermore, "[n]either the Federal Government nor a
State shall require a religious organization to- (A) alter its form
of internal governance; or (B) remove religious art, icons, scripture,
or other symbols." 97 This language does not reconcile easily with

89. Id. § 604a(g) (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 604a(j).
91. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92. 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(b).
93. For instance, if an organization follows Biblical teachings, it may believe that it must
follow Christ's command that his followers "make disciples of all nations." Matthew 28:19
(New International Version).
94. 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(b).
95. The Free Exercise Clause absolutely protects an individual's/group's right to believe
not its right to act. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
96. 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(d)(1).
97. Id. § 604a(d)(2). The Supreme Court has addressed a line of cases on the
constitutionality of displays of religious symbols on public property. See County of
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the Establishment Clause. For example, if a synagogue expresses
its religious beliefs by invoking a prayer to Yahweh before it serves
a meal to a homeless person, then, according to the language
quoted above, the synagogue should be able to continue to do so
after receiving funds from the federal government through the
state. However, if the homeless person is Hindu, then her own
religious freedom may be restricted by the prayer, thus violating
other clauses in the Provision.

When each clause of the Provision is read separately, it seems
to provide funds to faith communities while promoting religious
freedom for the organization and the individual with minimal
governmental involvement. Such balance between free exercise
and establishment sounds too good to be true, and so it is. The
religious character and practices of a grantee will inevitably clash
with the religious freedoms of a beneficiary.98 The Provision,

however, provides no solution that will allow a beneficiary to take
advantage of the unique success that religiously based programs
99

enjoy.

One of the reasons for the dilemma in the Provision may be
that Congress does not understand the interplay of religion and
assistance to the poor that exists in most faith communities. 10 0

The essay by Secretary Henry Cisneros exemplifies such lack of
understanding.''

Secretary Cisneros praises the success of faith

communities and appears to explain why they are so successful.0 2
Yet, he ignores the religious aspect of these organizations.0 3 He
does not mention the goal of proselytizing that is essential in most

Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a
menorah could be erected on city property next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting
liberty in America); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that inclusion of creche
in Christmas display does not violate the First Amendment); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (striking down a state statute that required public schools to post the Ten
Commandments).
98. See Frame, supra note 72.
99. See discussion infra note 107 (discussing section 604a(e)(1), which requires states to
establish an alternative non-sectarian service provider).
100. See Amy L. Sherman, Cross Purposes: Will Conservative Welfare Reform Corrupt
Religious Charities?,74 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV., Fall 1995, at 58 (stating that "the
dilution of a ministry's religious distinctiveness may remove the very element that makes it
so effective in addressing social problems").
101. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45; see also Marvin Olasky, Faith in What?,
WORLD, Sept. 28, 1996, at 30.
102. See CISNEROS, supra note 28.
103. See id.
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faith communities. 1"
Although he praises how the "[f]aith
[c]ommunities [t]ouch the [s]oul,"' 5 the thinking and feeling part
of our being, he fails to acknowledge that they also reach out to the
spirit, the part of our being that responds to religion and decides
what to believe. Yet, when the organizations themselves describe
their mission, they inevitably address the spiritual nature of their
programs.' 6
The Provision may have one saving grace. The Provision
requires that the state offer "an alternative provider that is
accessible to the individual" if a beneficiary of the assistance
objects "to the religious character of the organization or institution."' 7 Since the Provision requires the state to establish an
alternative, no recipient will be forced to choose between a
religious organization and no assistance at all. Thus, the Hindu
offended by the prayer to Yahweh may go to the secular alternative down the street and receive the same benefits without the
prayer.
Although this section assists the beneficiaries of welfare, it
does not cure the Provision's ambiguities from the perspective of
the faith communities. A problem remaining for the organizations
that may receive funding under the Provision is the ambiguity
about what activities they may continue to perform without
violating PRWORA. After describing the Provision, Reverend
Stephen Burger, Executive Director, International Union of Gospel
Missions ("IUGM"), asks what is meant by "sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization.'' °8 Burger wonders if providers
may say prayers before distributing food and how the organization
practically reconciles a beneficiary's beliefs with the mission of the
program.1 °9 Burger insists that these questions and others must

104. See generally id.

105. Id. at 5.
106. See Frame, supra note 72 (The Gospel Mission of Washington, D.C., "is in the
business of spreading the grace of God.").
107. 42 U.S.C.S. at § 604a(e)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Interestingly, the Provision
requires the state to provide an alternative if the individual objects to the characterof the
organization, not its activities. Thus, theoretically, a Jewish person may object to receiving
funds from a mosque simply because of its association to Islam even if the program provided
by the mosque to the beneficiary is not religious in and of itself.
108. Letter from Reverend Stephen Burger, Executive Director, International Union of
Gospel Missions (IUGM) [hereinafter Letter from Burger]. The IUGM has over 250 faithbased rescue missions that house an average of 27,000 people a night. See id.
109.

See id.
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be answered before organizations such as the IUGM are willing to
accept governmental funding.1 ' Burger fears that faith communities will be exposed to litigation if they accept funding under the
Provision."' Regardless of whether the organization wins the
lawsuit, according to Burger, the group must expend time and
resources in the suit that are better spent "helping drug addicts
and
112
needy individuals return to productive, self-sufficient lives.,
C Lemon v. Kurtzman and the Test for Establishment of a
Religion

The Supreme Court designed a test to determine whether a
statute violated the Establishment Clause in the seminal case
Lemon v. Kurtzman.
In Lemon, two state statutes' 4 were
challenged because state-funded teachers taught secular subjects in
sectarian schools. 15 The Supreme Court held that the statutes
violated the Establishment Clause.11 6 In its reasoning, the Lemon
Court designed a three prong test to use in determining whether a
statute violates the Establishment Clause. 7
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that "the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose."1 8 This prong is the
easiest to satisfy; the Court looks at the stated purpose of the
government in its analysis." 9 The second prong states that "[the
statute's] principal or primary effect must be one that neither
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Other tests have been proposed to decide when a statute
violates the Establishment Clause, including applying strict scrutiny to governmental action
that discriminates on the basis of religion. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982);
Timothy S. Burgett, Note, Government Aid to Religious Social Services Providers: The
Supreme Court's "Pervasively Sectarian" Standard, 75 VA. L. REV. 1077 (1989).
114. See The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (West 1971) (repealed 1977); The Rhode Island Salary
Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to 15-51-9 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980).
115. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
116. See id. at 607.
117. See id. at 612-13.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 613 (stating that, absent any evidence undermining the state's purpose, the
Court gives deference to the governmental purpose). In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988), the Court said that it was in no "position to doubt" Congress' purposes. Id. at 604.
One commentary states that the Supreme Court usually defers to the governmental findings
and purposes. See Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programsand Governmental
Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 654 n.37 (1992) (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 416-17 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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advances nor inhibits religion., 12' The Lemon Court did not
decide whether the effect of the two statutes was to advance a
religion. 12' The third prong requires that "the statute must ' not
t22
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. "
In analyzing the entanglement prong, the Court considers three
factors: 1) the character and purposes of the organization; 2) the
nature of the aid from the state; and 3) the relationship between
the organization and the government that results. 123 The Lemon
Court held that the statutes at2 issue
were unconstitutional because
4
prong.
third
the
violated
they
D. Bowen v. Kendrick and "Pervasive Sectarianism"
25
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Bowen v. Kendrick,
a case that challenged a statute similar to PRWORA. At issue in
Bowen was the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), which
provided grants to organizations, public and private, "for services
and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations
and pregnancy.' t 26 Religious organizations were included among
the recipients of the grants.127 A group of taxpayers challenged
AFLA arguing that funding to religious organizations violated the
Establishment Clause. 128 The Supreme Court upheld the statute
on the grounds that the statute did not violate the Clause "on its
face"; the Court remanded for reconsideration of the "as applied"
challenge regarding pervasively sectarian organizations.12 9 In
Bowen, the district court had held that the statute was unconstitutional because it gave funds to pervasively sectarian organizations.t °
AFLA strives to use federal services to "promote the involvement of parents, and should 'emphasize the provision of support by
other family members, religious and charitable organizations,

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citation omitted).
See id. at 613.
Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
See id. at 615.
See id. at 614.
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Id. at 593 (quoting S. 161, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981)).
See id.
See id. at 597.
See id. at 620.
See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 622.
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voluntary associations, and other groups." ' 131 AFLA restricts the
possible uses of the funds granted by forbidding moneys to go to
"family planning services" and granting funds only to programs that
"'do not provide abortions
or abortion counseling or referral"' or
132
encourage abortion.
In its analysis, the Court applied the Lemon test 133 to
AFLA. 134 First, the Court found that AFLA had a valid secular
purpose to prevent teenage pregnancy and premarital sex, both of
which caused economic and social injury. 35 Next, the Court
inquired into the "primary effect" of AFLA.'36 The Court stated
that the services were not uniquely religious nor were religious
organizations alone capable of providing the services. 137 Congress
merely believed that religious organizations could assist in achieving the goals of AFLA. 13 Thus, the Court concluded that any
1 39
advancement of religion was "incidental and remote.
In deciding the primary effect of AFLA, one factor on which
the Court focused was whether the religious organizations were
pervasively sectarian.14' Although the Court failed to define this
4
term, it did quote Hunt v. McNair,1
1 which held that "[a]id
normally thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission" is unconstitutional.t 42 The Court held that, on its face,
AFLA did not show that a large portion of the religious organizations would be pervasively sectarian.1 43 The Court found that the
primary effect was not to promote religion because not all grants

131. Id. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(10)(C) (1994)).
132. Id. at 596-97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a)).
133. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Members of the Supreme Court have
criticized the Lemon test. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 613-19 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Many
scholars have also questioned the validity of the test. See, e.g., Chopko, supra note 119;
Engstrom, supra note 23.
134. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602.
135. See id. at 602.
136. Id. at 604.
137. See id. at 604-05.
138. See id. at 606-07.
139. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 607.
140. See id. at 610.
141. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
142. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610 (quoting Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743).
143. See id.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:2

would go to pervasively sectarian institutions.1"
The Court,
however, did not address the validity of AFLA if the religious
organizations at issue were pervasively sectarian. 45
Bowen is the first case to apply the "pervasively sectarian" test
to social services cases.1 6 Bowen is also the first religious liberty
case that addresses a federal social services statute.
The Bowen Court is unhelpful in defining "pervasively
sectarian." The Supreme Court previously had attempted to define
147
this term in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland.
The Court recognized that institutions were pervasively sectarian
when religion "so permeate[d] the defendant colleges that their
religious and secular functions were inseparable.' ' 148 According
to the Court, to determine whether an institution is pervasively
sectarian, a court must "paint a general picture of the institution,
composed of many elements.', 49 Apparently, then, the nature of
the religious institution, not its conduct, determines whether it is
pervasively sectarian. Thus, an organization cannot merely change
its conduct to avoid constitutional scrutiny 5 ° Some commentators have criticized the pervasively sectarian standard as narrowminded or "bigotry directed at the institution itself.' 51
E. Applying Lemon to the Provision52
In order to determine the constitutionality of the Charitable
Choice Provision, a court must apply the three-part Lemon test.15 '
Under the test, a court first must decide if the Provision has a valid
secular purpose. 1 4 The reason behind the Provision is to more
effectively solve the problems that have arisen due to increased

144. See id. at 611.
145. See id.
146. Burgett, supra note 113, at 1078.
147. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
148. Id. at 750.
149. Id. at 758.
150. See generally Chopko, supra note 119.
151. Id. at 658.
152. The scope of this comment does not extend to an anslysis of how the Provision
would be interpreted in Lemon were overruled and a flexible accommodation test or
endorsement test were adopted. See discussion infra notes 207-209.
153. See supra Part III.C.
154. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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out-of-wedlock pregnancies and births.155 This purpose is a valid
secular one because the findings of Congress show that prevention
of these pregnancies and births may reasonably be believed to
number of recipients of welfare and the number of
reduce 15the
6
crimes.
Next, a court must look at the primary effect of the Provision.157 The court should ask whether, despite intent, the Provision actually advances a religion. On its face, the Provision
probably does not. The Provision does not favor any particular
religion or religion in general nor does it require the states to fund
religion. It only prohibits states from discriminating against religion
in general.15 8 Additionally, the Provision forbids the use of
funding for religious activities.'59
The next inquiry is whether the Provision has the primary
effect of advancing a religion when applied. 6" Religious affiliation alone is not enough to prove a primary effect of advancing
religion. 16' Thus, if religious organizations can separate welfare
services from sectarian activities, the government-funded welfare
services they provide will be distinct and uninfluenced by their
sectarian activities. When the Provision is applied to a pervasively
sectarian organization, however, an application of the Provision is
unconstitutional. 162 Even if found unconstitutional in this situation, it would not be deemed entirely struck down because the
Provision would still be constitutional as applied to other organizations.163 However, Congress, through the States, may not fund
faith communities that are classified as pervasively sectarian.
Finally, a court must determine whether the statute causes "an
The
excessive government entanglement with religion." 6"
the
Provision.
to
challenge
entanglement prong presents a great
The government's audit of the organization's books to make sure

155. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2110, cited in 42 U.S.C.S. § 601 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1997) (History; Ancillary Laws and Directives).
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
158. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(c).
159. See id. § 604a(j).
160. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
161. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 621 (1988).
162. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
"pervasively sectarian").
163. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621.
164. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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that funds are not used for sectarian purposes could be considered
excessive entanglement because the government would be immersing itself in the organization by scrutinizing the allocation of funds.
One section of the Provision may help faith communities
receive funding without compromising their methods of operation.165 Paragraph 604a(h)(2) states that if a religious organization that receives funding "segregates Federal funds provided under
such programs into separate accounts, then only the financial
166
assistance provided with such funds shall be subject to audit.
Another entanglement problem arises when the courts decide
which organizations are pervasively sectarian. Courts could follow
the same pattern that they did when defining "pervasively sectarian" in the school aid cases. 167 Such a path could result in a
judicial distinction between the food served to the recipient at a
table and the recipient going to the kitchen for it himself.168 If
the courts overburden themselves in investigating the inner
workings of individual programs, they may get themselves so
entangled within the programs so as to violate Lemon's third prong.
Finally, either Congress or the states may need to pass so
many regulations in order to prevent the funds from being used for
sectarian purposes that the government will become excessively
entangled. 169 Thus, a Catch 22 results. If the government does
not regulate the funding of the religious organizations, it cannot
guarantee that the funding will be used in a constitutional manner.
Therefore, in order to ensure the constitutionality of the funding,
the government must pass such an inordinate amount of regulations
that it will become excessively entangled with religion. One
commentary, in particular, has criticized the excessive entanglement
prong because of the Catch 22 that results. 7 '

165. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 604a(h)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
166. Id. To further limit government involvement, the organization could form an
independent S corporation that would have the exclusive care of the welfare recipients; thus,
any governmental audits would only be done on the corporation, not the religious entity
itself. See A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 43. No organization is required
to take these measures. See id.
167. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 737 (1976). See also
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680 (1971).
168. See cases cited, supra note 22. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the minute distinctions made in the school aid cases).
169. See generally Chopko, supra note 119.
170. See id.
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Governmental Interference in Religious Practice

Although many Americans fear that religion will unduly
influence the government, an increasing number of people are
beginning to realize that the government has increasingly influenced religious organizations.17 When a faith community accepts
governmental funding, it will be required to open up its books,
administration, and practices to governmental scrutiny. The third

prong of the Lemon test is most applicable in avoiding such
interference.
A faith community that accepts governmental funding for its

soup kitchen should do so warily. When an organization accepts
172
government funds, it agrees to play by the government's rules.
An unknowing religious organization could accept the money
expecting to be able to continue to say a prayer before every meal
and to teach the homeless in the shelter about God. Once the
group realizes that it may not carry on as usual, it has already been

placed in a precarious position. The organization may have to
return the money, since the funds were used for an unconstitutional

purpose, and no longer operate as a grantee under the Provision. 173 The problem, however, is that down-sizing a program is

challenging and often more difficult than establishing the program
in the first place. The other option for the organization is to
compromise its character and become more secular in nature.17 4

171. Some people fear that the government will gain too much power over religious
organizations through the use of the Provision. See Robin Blumner, And now, Welfare for
Churches, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at 4D. See also Samuel K. Atchison, FaithBased Charities Feed Soul and Body; Nourish Body, Spirit with Limited Resources, THE
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 31, 1996, at 6E; Sherman, supra note 100, at 58.
172. See Chopko, supra note 119, at 663. Congress uses the carrot method to regulate
private actions. Congress may do so unless it uses the method to violate a constitutional
right. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine regulates such governmental action. For
a discussion of the doctrine, see Charles R. Bogle, "Unconscionable" Conditions: A
ContractualAnalysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 193,
196 (1994); Burgett, supra note 113, at 1098.
173. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 75, § 17.4(c)(1) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The Court will consider two factors in determining whether a sectarian
institution must reimburse government funds: 1) whether the institution reasonably relied on
the payments and the degree of the reliance; and 2) whether the refunds are necessary to
protect the constitutional rights involved. See id.
174. Since the Supreme Court has defined "pervasively sectarian" based on the character
of the organization, a group cannot avoid the problem by merely applying the funds to
secular acts. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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If the second option is chosen, as is more often the case,'75 the
organization will lose its religious character; this, in effect, allows
the government to influence religion.'76 The government would,
thus, restrict the free exercise of the religion.'77
IV. Alternatives to the Provision
Other methods can achieve the purpose of the Provision
without exposing religious organizations and the government to
endless litigation. One such method is to change the Internal
Revenue Code in order to provide more benefits for charitable
contributions to programs that fill the welfare void.'7 8 Another
option is for the Supreme Court to modify explicitly its definition
of "pervasively sectarian" to focus on conduct and not character.
Finally, Congress should define "pervasively sectarian" so that
faith-based institutions are aware of the risk they may run in
accepting funds under the Provision.
A. Revising the Tax Code
Instead of attempting to privatize through Congress, one
alternative to the Provision is to allow the individual taxpayer to
choose which organizations receive funding by providing incentives
for charitable contributions. Advocates of a tax credit believe that
taxpayers will have more motivation to give to charities if the
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") is revised to provide more tax
benefits for giving.'79 If taxpayers are choosing which organizations receive funding, they may support the religious organization
of their choice, and the constitutional questions will become
moot.18 ° Yet, the aid recipients would still receive the same care
as they would under the current Act. One may argue that if
taxpayers are given the choice, they may not always choose the best

175. See Sherman, supra note 100, at 58 (citing "the potential danger of secularization"
as a possible result of funding to religious organizations).
176. See id.
177. One could argue that the government has done nothing except enforce its provisions
and that the organization has brought the dilemma upon itself. Such an argument would,
however, ignore the trap that government set up in the language of the Provision that states
that the organization need not change its practices to accept funding.
178. See discussion infra notes 183-201.
179. See John Sparks & Christopher Cooper, Charity Tax Credit:An Overview, Dec. 3,
1996 (unpublished study, on file with the Dickinson Law Review).
180. The Constitution only applies to governmental action. If the government is not
involved, then no constitutional question exists.
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organization, the one with the highest success rate. Taxpayers,
however, should be trusted to spend their money in the most
advantageous manner. Proposals have already been introduced in
Congress to increase the amount recoverable for charitable
contributions."' 1
Currently, section 170 of the I.R.C. allows
deductions for charitable contributions that do not exceed fifty
percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income, subject to some
limitations.'
Regulations further govern other aspects of deduc3 reduction
tions, such as the allowance and timing of deductions,"
8 and contributions of future interests. 85
in amounts,"
One proposal to change the Code is to broaden the deduction
allowed under section 170 of the I.R.C. The amount deductible
could be increased by either eliminating the fifty percent ceiling or
by raising it. Another option is to make charitable contributions
"above the line" deductions. Such deductions would reduce the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income;8 6 this reduction would not only
effect the taxpayer's taxable income but also the amount charged
for state income tax in certain states.
The problem with adjusting charitable deductions "below the
line" is that the deduction only benefits those who itemize their
87
deductions."
Because people may opt for the standardized
deduction, only the wealthier taxpayers who itemize would benefit
from deductions for charitable contributions.1
Instead of broadening deductions, a tax credit could be given
for charitable contributions.8 9 Tax credits can come in many
forms and can be advantageous to individuals other than just

181. See Sparks & Cooper, supra note 179.
182. See I.R.C. § 170 (1996).
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (1998).
184. See id. § 1.170A-4.
185. See id. § 1.170A-5.
186. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 548-49 (9th ed. 1996).
187. See id.
188. See Joel Maxwell & Bob Jones IV, God Loves a Cheerful Giver (But Uncle Sam Is
Not So Picky), WORLD, Apr. 6, 1996, at 12.
189. A tax credit would be more advantageous than a deduction. Deductions for
charitable contributions are taken from a taxpayer's adjusted gross income before the tax
rate is applied to the taxpayer's taxable income. Thus, a taxpayer may only receive a
percentage of his deductions. For example, a taxpayer may only receive 30 cents on the
dollar in deductions for charitable contributions. A credit, on the other hand, is subtracted
from a taxpayer's taxable income. Thus, the taxpayer receives a dollar-for-dollar reduction
of his taxes. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 186, at 972.
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wealthy contributors. 9" Senator Daniel Coats initially proposed
a tax credit for inclusion into PRWORA. 191 The proposal would
allow states to use the block grants from the federal government to
give a tax credit for charitable contributions.192 The Comprehensive Charity Reform Act 193 ("CCRA") could accomplish the same
goals as the Charitable Choice Provision. Under CCRA, single
taxpayers could receive a tax credit up to five hundred dollars, and
married people filing jointly could receive up to one thousand
dollars.' 94
Senator Coats proposed the credit to allow the decisions of
funding the war against poverty to be made by the public. 195
Money allocated for welfare spending and cuts in corporate welfare
could be used to fund the credit. 196 Another advantage to the
credit is that charities can receive more money because additional
costs for government administration would not exist. 97 According to one figure, only one third of federal welfare funds actually
reaches the poor. 98 Another alternative is a seventy-five percent
"credit for contributions to private charities that deliver services to
the poor," up to a maximum of four hundred dollars for married
couples filing jointly and two hundred dollars for individuals 99
One radical proposal is to give a tax credit for financial
contributions combined with time donated to charities that seek to
provide welfare to its recipients. 200 Senator Ashcroft has pro-

190. Congress may decide to replace the current tax system with a flat tax. Two
alternatives are proposed for addressing charitable contributions if a flat tax is adopted. The
first is to eliminate all tax incentives for charitable contributions along with all other
deductions and credits. The second option is to create an exception for charitable
contributions by giving a tax credit for such contributions. See Maxwell & Jones, supra note
188.
191. See Coats Leads Effort, supra note 55.
192. See id.
193. 141 CONG. REC. S10822-01 (daily ed. July 27, 1995).
194. Senator Daniel Coats proposed this I.R.C. revision. See Maxwell & Jones, supra
note 188; Coats Leads Effort, supra note 55. Taxpayers may receive the credit for
contributions to charities in their own community. See id.
195. See Coats Leads Effort, supra note 55.
196. See Daniel Coats, The Projectfor American Renewal: An Overview (visited Dec. 1,
1996) <http:/www.senate.gov/-coats/1-2-3.html>.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Sparks & Cooper, supra note 179, at 3. Representatives Jim Talent and J.C.
Watts proposed this legislation. See Stuart M. Butler, Rethinking the Safety Net, VISION &
VALUES (ALUMNI Assoc. PUB., GROVE CITY COLLEGE, PA.) July 1996, at 7.

200. See Bid Farewell, supra note 10.
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posed such a credit because it would "[affirm] the idea that
donating time is as important as giving money in helping people get
off welfare., 201 Under Ashcroft's proposal, taxpayers may receive
five hundred dollars in credit for donating five hundred dollars and

fifty hours of their time to one organization.2 °2 The purpose of
such a requirement to obtain the credit is to encourage taxpayers
to form relationships with organizations that will enable the

taxpayer to have more of an impact in reforming welfare and will
give continuity to the program. 2 3 These proposals may reappear
on the Senate floor.2 °4
20 5

B. Judicial Changes

A second alternative is directed at the Supreme Court. The
Court may redefine "pervasively sectarian" to focus on the
organization's conduct rather than its character.2 6 If conduct
becomes the focus, then an organization may adjust its programs to
receive funding without actually changing its inherent character.
Redefining "pervasively sectarian" creates three problems.
First, it would require the Court to overrule prior case law, like
Roemer, which is a rarity for the courts.2 7 Additionally, the

201. Id.
202. See S. REP. No. 104-846, at 2 (1995).
203. See Summary of S. REP. No. 104-846, Communities Included in Caring Act (CNIC)
produced by Office of Sen. John Ashcroft, May 1995 (on file with the Dickinson Law
Review).
204. See Sparks & Cooper, supra note 179. Some people criticize the notion of a tax
credit because little evidence exists that a credit will actually motivate taxpayers to give
more. See id.
205. The Court generally may be abandoning decades of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. See generally Ronald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L. REV. 881 (1993).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 141-51. One legal scholar argues that the Court
has already implicitly overruled the pervasively sectarian standard in Rosenburger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See Esbeck, supra note 32. See also A
GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 43, at 21-23 nn.9-10. Although dicta in
Rosenburger could be read to say that the Court will no longer apply the pervasively
sectarian standard, the Court also distinguishes the facts in Rosenburger from other cases of
state action because the funds that were purportedly used for religious purposes came from
a Student Activities Fund and not from tax money. See Rosenburger,515 U.S. at 840-41.
Rosenburgercould also be read to show the Court's uneasiness with the standard because
the standard allows the government to decide what organizations are too religious. See id.
at 844-45. Thus, the Court may decide to reject explicitly the pervasively sectarian standard
in the future.
207. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992)
(explaining the power of stare decisis). Justice O'Connor gives four circumstances for the
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alternative would not solve the problem of excessive governmental
entanglement, since the government would scrutinize the organization's books and practices to be sure that the money was not used
for sectarian purposes. Third, excessive litigation would result.
Faith communities would be subjected to greater amounts of
litigation as the courts decide whether the money is used unconstitutionally for sectarian purposes."a 8 The Supreme Court likely
would be wary of another line of cases similar to the school aid
9
cases.

20

Instead of altering the Court's analysis of pervasively sectarian
groups, the Court could eliminate the Lemon test entirely. The
Court has contemplated replacing the test.2 10 Justice O'Connor
proposed the endorsement test, which would analyze whether direct
governmental action endorsed a religion or religious practice.211
Justice Kennedy also proposed an alternative to Lemon, the
flexible accommodation test, which prohibits government from
giving direct benefits to religion so that the government is establishing a religion; additionally, the government could not coerce
participation.212 To adopt one of these tests, however, the Supreme Court must overrule or contradict its long line of cases that
relied on the Lemon test.213

Court to consider in overruling prior precedent:
[W]hether the rule has been proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add equity to the cost of
repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have
so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.
Id. at 854-55 (citations omitted).
Recently, the Court did overrule an Establishment Clause case in its last term. See
Agastoni v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
However, the analysis the Court used does not effect this comment.
208. See Letter from Burger, supra note 108.
209. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
210. For an analysis of the potential changes in Establishment Clause analysis, see
Engstrom, supra note 23.
211. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion of both O'Connor's and Kennedy's tests,
see Mykkeltvedt, supra note 205.
213. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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C. Alternative Language in the Provision
Along the lines of the judicial changes, Congress could add
language into the Provision that clearly defines who is eligible for
the grants, such as those groups that are not pervasively sectarian.214 The Provision or its regulations should define "pervasively
sectarian." In a brochure that explains the Provision and how it
should be implemented, the pervasively sectarian standard is
mentioned only once in a footnote.2" 5 Although a legislative
definition would not change the possible legal dilemmas that arise
as a result of the Provision, it may act as a warning to those
organizations that could be classified as pervasively sectarian. In
turn, knowledge of what organizations are pervasively sectarian
could significantly reduce the number of organizations that receive
grants that a court might later hold unconstitutional.
V.

Conclusion

PRWORA takes a step toward placing welfare into private
hands and reducing governmental control. The Charitable Choice
Provision allows states to fund religious organizations that provide
for needy people.
Religious organizations have a history of success in providing
for the poor. Not only do they provide for physical needs but also
for spiritual needs. The latter sets them apart from governmental
programs and, some would say, makes them so successful. Because
of their success, Congress is anxious to give them the opportunity
to receive funding so that they may carry the burden that Congress
has arguably failed to carry in the last sixty years.
Unfortunately, the very spiritual aspect that makes religious
organizations so unique is what must be eliminated if they receive
funding. In order to receive funding, an organization must use the
federal funds consistent with the Lemon test; that is, the funds must
be used for a secular purpose, the funding must not have the effect

214. For a definition of "pervasively sectarian," see supra text accompanying notes 14151.
215. See A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 43, at 23 n.10. A reason given
for the lack of discussion regarding the "pervasively sectarian" standard in the brochure is
the interpretation of recent Supreme Court law that may indicate the Court is moving away
from the "pervasively sectarian" distinction. See Telephone Interview with Annie Billings,
Legislative Assistant to U.S. Sen. John Ascroft (Jan. 31, 1997). See also supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
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of establishing a religion, and the government cannot become
excessively entangled with the organization. The Provision does
not violate the Lemon test on its face and as applied to organizations that are not pervasively sectarian; however, the Provision
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny if funds are given to pervasively sectarian organizations. The wall of separation of church and
state threatens to block the ability of religious organizations to
reach out to the poor.
Because the Provision leaves religious organizations with a
Hobson's choice, the Provision, albeit well-intentioned, cannot
achieve the goals set by Congress. Other avenues must be explored
to achieve privatization of welfare and maximize the benefits of
faith communities. One alternative is to modify the Internal
Revenue Code to provide greater tax advantages for charitable
contributions. Another possibility is for the Supreme Court to
narrow its definition of "pervasively sectarian" to focus on conduct
rather than character. Finally, Congress should include in the
Provision an exemption from funding for pervasively sectarian
groups; this exemption would warn those organizations that may
fall into such a category not to accept funding in the first place.
If the Provision survives a constitutional challenge or any of
the alternatives are adopted, the effect could be profound. The
federal government has not completely surrendered its hold on
welfare; however, if private organizations prove to be effective
enough, the private sector may eventually provide most of the
welfare. The optimist will envision new generations learning the
importance of work, self discipline, and personal responsibility.
Michelle P Ryan

